Many studies have been conducted on China-Africa relations, including those written by Fairchild (2020), King (2020) and Nyadera, Agwanda and Kisaka (2020). This article builds on the latter studies to confront the real myths and realities of China‘s Africa policy. Firstly, It is worth noting to highlight the significant contributions of Fairchild (2020)‘s research study that revisits how sub-Saharan African countries especially those of the continental coastal democracies with abundant mineral resources engage with China for equal mutual benefit particularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Okay, so of the 3 major contributions to this study, at least one, seemingly the most significant, states that Chinese diplomacy (particularly BRI) is mutually beneficial.

After a careful critical analysis of China‘s Africa engagement in the context of the three highlighted countries, FairChild (2020) argues that even though BRI has been presented historically as a debt trap diplomacy, a mere interpretation of BRI as neo-imperialist risks analysing China through the lens of European history that discounts the active role of African countries. Forthright, he says that it is unfair to choose a one-size-fits-all understanding of China‘s practices in Africa.

So Fairchilds (2020) study, argues that interpretation of BRI as neo-imperialist is a reactionary Eurocentric view which both applies European imperialist intentions to China and removes the agency of African countries. Also that you can’t take a “one size fits all” understanding of Chinas involvement.

It is not far-fetched that this argument is rendering FairChild (2020)‘s research to sound more like a study conducted from a Chinese perspective that did not compare China‘s involvement in the coastal democracies with the likes of In-land African countries of Zambia, Angola and Kenya. Therefore, leaving us with a gab as to how come this stance is not broadened and compared. Hence, this study aims to build on top of Fairchild‘s study whilst disagreeing on not choosing a one-size-fits-all definition.

So they accuse Fairchild (2020) of basically being a China simp for not researching and comparing inland African countries. They aim to disagree with the premise that you cannot apply a “one-size-fits-all” analysis to Chinas involvement.

There is also the Study conducted by King (2020), that discusses the human resource traditions of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and those endorsed by the BRI with particular attention to the Education Action Plan for the BRI published by the Chinese Ministry of Education in the year 2016. The research article‘s value contribution stems from explicitly comparing the FOCAC HRD pledges with the recent ones related to Education Plan under BRI. A review of the same context is done under FOCAC VI and FOCAC VII that compares the discourse of action plans of the different plans, goals, and pledges in the implementation in various African countries including in Ethiopia and Kenya. A clear generated scholarly view from the study highlights that King‘s study supports the two plans undertaken between both China and the African States by indicating that social welfare is important to the development and also quotes Xi in 2017 who highlighted that ―Improving people‘s livelihood and well-being is the primary goal of development‖ (2020: 233). And additionally, supports his argument by quoting (Frankopan, 2018: 242) who has described China-Africa relations as ―win-win‖ through the mutual benefits and using cooperations combined with incentives to weave countries, peoples, and cultures in a so-presumed win-win scenario.

So now we establish that King(2020) also takes the view that Chinese diplomacy efforts are mutually beneficial after analyzing human resource traditions and those proposed by the BRI, particularly the education aspect of the plan.

It also references another study Frankopan (2018:243) who also describes Chinas relation as Win-Win and mutually beneficial.

We should then understand that the current article seeks to differ completely with the above highlighted of presenting China and Africa relations as win-win and add several relevant empirical findings that render his article relevant but short-sighted and best limited and myopic particularly looking at how China is not engaging in a win-win in the countries under study.

So this study is specifically trying to argue against these previous significant contributions as being short sighted, particularly because China is not engaging in “Win-Win” under the countries they will research. Harkening back to their prior insistance that you can apply a “one-size-fits-all” analysis.

The study of Nyadera, Agwanda, and Kisaka (2020) engage the attractiveness of China’s Africa engagement has raised some of the controversial perspectives and views recently. Also, this is a tale that continues to be welcomed with mixed feelings, from disquiet to confusion. They all show that China‘s Africa engagement is driven by its demand for minerals and oil whilst it delivers Africa‘s infrastructural needs. In Non-Economic drivers of China‘s Africa engagement, they all pinpoint at personality traits of Xi. They quote Cabestan in 2012 who understand XI‘s personality traits as driven by his ―realistic, efficient, and relaxed Party Secretary, conscious of the need for China to move towards a market economy‖ (2020: 09) that is useful in analysing his approach to Africa. Prominent former and current African leaders are understood to be in good books with Xi including Robert Mugabe (Late and Former Zimbabwean President) who described XI as a ―true and dear friend‖ of Zimbabwe. His personality and leadership credentials and work have earned him his first honorary degree by the University of Johannesburg (UJ) in 2019. He is also understood to be having the choice of words, outspoken in nature that increased his interactions with African leaders. The second reason relates to the decline of Western countries‘ major investments in Africa in the post-second world war.

So basically, we establish that yet another study, Nyadera, Agwanda, and Kisaka (2020), frames this relationship as Win-Win “we get infrastructure they get resources”. Which is partially informed by Xi Jinpings own established personality as a “realistic, efficient, and relaxed Party Secretary, conscious of the need for China to move towards a market economy”. It also establishes that Xi is highly regarded among African leaders and institutions, and vice versa.

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If you read the article you can know I’m not nitpicking positive aspects, I’m not jumping around, this is the start of the study.

To avoid making this comment as long as an actual breakdown of an entire academic article, having demonstrated my willingness to engage with the work, can you go ahead and state some of what you believe to be the more valid points against Chinese involvement/framing Chinese involvement as imperialist from the study.

Sorry is China cutting people hand because they didn’t pick up their quota of rubber for the day? Ah that’s right, it was Belgium.

Quit downplaying the horror of real colonisation.

I can’t read that as it’s paywalled. Anyway here’s a lot of links about this topic, several from African leaders and diplomats on the difference between Chinese trade and development in Africa and actual imperialism as practiced by western countries:

• Debunking the claim that “China is Imperialist”
• The demeanor of Chinese leaders (Xi Jinping) vs Western leaders (Nancy Pelosi) towards African nations. One of the reasons why African nations favor China instead of the West. Full video here
• An African leader on the hypocrisy of those saying China is imperialist.
• China africa panel: if you want actual infrastructure, you go to China, not the west.
• Is China really imperialist? What’s the difference between what Europe did to Africa, and what China is doing?
• Five imperialist myths about China’s role in Africa.
• Evo Morales - Why China and Russia aren’t imperialist, but the US is.
• US air force veteran Bill Brown breaks down the history of anti-chinese propaganda, and why China is not colonialist like the west.
• Yanis Varoufakis on China’s foreign policy dealings with Greece and Africa.
• Vijay Prashad and Qiao Collective - Is China imperializing Africa?
• Danny Haiphong from BlackAgenaReport interview with Anya Parampil from thegrayzone: on the new cold war, and a myriad of lies about China.
• The Belt and Road Initiative: the antithesis of Colonialism.
• The war on China : and geopolitical significance of the belt and road initiative.
• China has forgiven over $10B in debt, over half to Cuba, but also including > 20 African nations, Pakistan, and Cambodia.
• After covid, China suspends debt repayment for 77 countries, promises > $2B USD and medical supplies as aid to help developing countries fight covid.
• President Xi pledges coronavirus vaccine to Africa first, helps fund African CDC headquarters.
• The chinese debt trap is a myth.
• China writes off $6M in debt to rwanda, provides another $60M in grants.
• China forgives over $78M in Cameroon debt.
• China writes off $36m Mozambican debt.
• China writes off substantial amount of Angola debt.
• After a group of Guangdong landlords evicted a group of Africans, the CPC arrested them, apologized to the African Union, paid for hotels for the migrants, passed a series of anti-discrimination laws, and spent weeks going to all the restaurants, landlords, and taxis to warn them of the law.
• Nato’s new enemy: the CPC.
• The western media’s China hysteria.