It is. It’s just… how do you know you’re actually talking to the fingerprint sensor and not a fake one that’s been plugged in?
Think of it like a locked mailbox: the fingerprint sensor might securely match the fingerprint and only unlock if it’s correct—but if anyone can swap out the mailbox with their own lookalike, and the OS just blindly accepts the “unlocked” signal, the whole security model breaks. Without an attestation mechanism (like SDCP on Windows or secure enclave-backed verification), the OS can’t prove it’s getting input from trusted hardware. Match-on-chip helps, but it’s not enough unless the result is cryptographically signed by the sensor and validated by the OS through a trusted, authenticated channel.
That’s the gap in Linux: there’s no widely adopted standard for verifying that trust path end-to-end.
It is. It’s just… how do you know you’re actually talking to the fingerprint sensor and not a fake one that’s been plugged in?
Think of it like a locked mailbox: the fingerprint sensor might securely match the fingerprint and only unlock if it’s correct—but if anyone can swap out the mailbox with their own lookalike, and the OS just blindly accepts the “unlocked” signal, the whole security model breaks. Without an attestation mechanism (like SDCP on Windows or secure enclave-backed verification), the OS can’t prove it’s getting input from trusted hardware. Match-on-chip helps, but it’s not enough unless the result is cryptographically signed by the sensor and validated by the OS through a trusted, authenticated channel.
That’s the gap in Linux: there’s no widely adopted standard for verifying that trust path end-to-end.